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1. Types of Opposition to Vegetarianism 
Although supporters of vegetarianism (and animals' 
interests in general) come in many varieties, we may 
distinguish two groups. First, utilitarians such as Singer 
base their argument on the suffering that factory farming 
causes to nonhumans and the absence of comparable 
benefits to humans. l Second, the animal rights view, as 
expressed by Regan, extends Kant's respect for persons 
principle to include nonhumans and argues that meat 
eating wrongly treats nonhumans merely as means.2 
Similarly, I find it useful to distinguish two types 
of defense of meat eating. My division is based on 
how each group responds to Singer's demand that we 
extend the equal consideration of interests principle3 
to include nonhumans and to his parallel between 
speciesism and, on the other hand, racism and sexism. 
Some grant Singer's premise that nonhumans do 
deserve equal consideration of interests, but they argue 
either that animals actually benefit from being raised 
on farms or that their suffering is outweighed by 
human gains. Others, paralleling Regan's rights 
approach, reject utilitarian calculations of interests. 
However, they argue, in direct opposition to Regan, 
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that animals' interests are qualitatively less important 
than those of humans or even that animals' interests 
are not morally significant at all. While we should not 
gratuitously cause them suffering, we may use them 
as we wish in order to benefit ourselves. In contrast to 
utilitarian defenders of meat eating, I call this second 
group "human supremacists." 
My goal in this paper is to argue that neither type of 
defense of meat eating is successful against Singer's 
utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. Instead of 
attempting a comprehensive response to all defenses 
that fall into these two categories, I will focus on what 
I consider to be the most powerful, representative ones. 
I have confined myself to Singer's argument for the 
strategic reason that it requires only that we extend 
moral concern to all sentient beings. Sceptics are more 
likely to grant this premise than they are to accept 
Regan's persuasively argued but more controversial 
view that all animals have an intrinsic value that may 
notbe sacrificed in the course of utilitarian caIculations.4 
2. Utilitarian Defenses of Meat Eating 
In this section, I am interested in those who try to justify 
meat eating on Singer's own utilitarian terms. They 
agree, that is, that to attempt to justify meat eating by 
simply asserting that humans are superior to nonhumans 
is speciesist and that it is incumbent on them to explain 
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how human gains from meat eating outweigh non-
human suffering. I will focus mainly on R.G. Frey's 
justification ofmeat eating in his book, Rights, Killing, 
and Suffering.sFrey takes Singer's challenge seriously 
and gives a careful, detailed response.. 
Frey defends the strategy of the "concerned 
individual," who continues to eat meat but tries to 
reform farming techniques in order to eliminate cruelty 
to farm animals. He argues that Singer's demand for 
the end of factory farming is based on the implausible 
"single experience" view of suffering: meat eating is 
wrong if it causes any suffering at all to farm animals. 
Frey proposes that we adopt instead the "miserable life" 
view of suffering, according to which we may be 
justified in causing animals some pain in order to raise 
them for food, as long as we ensure that their lives are 
on balance more pleasant than painful. He points out 
that the "single experience" view of suffering would 
almost certainly have the absurd consequence that 
raising human children would also be wrong, since it 
would be practically impossible' to eliminate all 
suffering from their lives.6 
Frey is correct when he argues that the "miserable 
life" view of suffering is sup'erior to the "single 
experience" view. However, his argument neglects a 
third option that is more salutary than either of the ones 
he considers. I will call this third option the "minimal 
suffering" view. Granted, the "single experience" view 
is too stringent, but his "miserable life" view has the 
opposite fault ofbeing too lenient. It is itself vulnerable 
to a reductio: it would justify even the gratuitous 
infliction of suffering on our children, as long as the 
suffering is just barely outweighed by the pleasure they 
experience. Far more plausible is my "minimal 
suffering" view, which permits the infliction of suffering 
only when doing so prevents even greater suffering or 
when it is a deserved punishment for past behavior. 
Abusing children (while carefully ensuring that their 
overall happiness outweighs their suffering) is 
repugnant, because it does not serve any legitimate 
punitive purpose or prevent even greater long-term 
suffering, either for our children or ourselves. Similarly, 
the suffering caused to animals when we raise them 
for meat is justified only if they deserve it (which is 
clearly not the case) or if it helps to prevent even 
greater suffering. Consequently, the burden is on Frey 
to show what the benefits of continuing to raise 
animals for meat are and how they outweigh the 
suffering caused to animals. 
Frey argues that the concerned individual's tactic is 
sufficiently effective in reducing animals' suffering to 
justify continuing to raise animals for meat. lbroughout 
his book, Frey takes advantage of a concession that 
Singer makes: the equal consideration of interests 
principle does not necessarily condemn all meat 
farming, since animals raised on free range farms (and, 
we may suppose, on the kind of refOlmed farms that 
Frey proposes? may avoid much of the suffering for 
which Singer condemns factory farms. However, Singer 
questions whether even free range farms would reduce 
animals' suffering to a level that would be outweighed 
by humans' gains and whether, even if they did so, they 
would be economically feasible. 8 Moreover, he points 
out that the pertinent issue is whether we may eat today s 
meat, most of which is raised on factory farms. 9 In any 
event, even ifFrey were able to show that the concerned 
individual's tactic and vegetarianism would have 
equally good consequences for the animals, his 
argument for continuing to raise animals for meat would 
still depend on showing that doing so would have better 
consequences for humans than vegetarianism. 
Before we tum to Frey's answer to this challenge, 
let us examine another utilitarian defense ofmeat eating 
that goes even further than Frey's and argues that our 
practice of raising animals on farms benefits the animals 
themselves. Farm animals have become domesticated, 
so the argument goes, and would be unable to survive 
in nature, were we to set them free. Ifexposed to life in 
the wild-bitter winters, savage predators, etc.-farm 
animals would be likely to die slowly and painfully from 
starvation, or quickly and savagely at the hands of 
wolves and bear. As long as we follow Frey's concerned 
individual's tactic and reform our farming practices to 
give animals long and peaceful lives, we are actually 
doing them a favor. A life that is overall pleasurable, 
even though it might contain some pain, is preferable 
to no life at all, which is the likely consequence of 
ending meat farming. 
This "animal husbandry" argument can draw support 
from an unexpected source: 1. Baird Callicott's defense 
of a "land ethic." He criticizes supporters of animal 
rights for ignoring the vital distinction between wild 
and domestic animals. lO He argues that none of the 
likely outcomes ofour ceasing to raise animals for meat 
are favorable to the animals themselves. Unused to 
fending for themselves in competition with other wild 
animals, domestic animals are likely to become extinct, 
and we might consider it more humane simply to allow 
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existing fann animals to die peacefully on fanns than 
to put them at the mercy of predators. Callicott 
comments on the irony of the liberation of domestic 
animals resulting in their extinction.ll 
I follow Bart Gruzalski in biting the bullet in 
response to this reductio ad absurdum argument.12 The 
discontinuation ofmeat farming will likely result in the 
replacement of domestic by wild animals. But this is 
an advantage, since it will result in an increase in the 
total amount of pleasure experienced by nonhuman 
animals. First, even if the adoption ofFrey's concerned 
individual's tactic makes domestic animals' lives 
pleasurable, this pleasure will be replaced by that of 
the additional wild animals that will flourish on the land 
previously used for grazing on farms. i3 Second, wild 
animals live more pleasurable lives than domestic ones. 
Gruzalski points out that no amount of modification of 
our current farming practices will eliminate the 
frustration of animals' natural urges and instincts, in 
terms of movement, social organization, and diet. Thus, 
it isn't clear that animals raised in the manner proposed 
by Frey's "concerned individual" have lives that are on 
balance pleasurable. In contrast, while wild animals can 
indeed suffer painful "natural" deaths from predators, 
these deaths at least avoid the additional terror caused 
by the unfamiliar environment of the slaughterhouse. 
And some wild animals die peacefully of old age, thus 
avoiding any terror at all. 
We still need to address another of Callicott's 
objections, which is also based on the distinction 
between domestic and wild animals. Arguments (such 
as Gruzalski's) that claim that meat fanning frustrates 
animals' "natural desires" neglect the fact that "human 
artifacts" such as domestic animals do not hflve a nature 
that can be violated. 
It would make almost as much sense to speak 
of the natural behavior of tables and chairS.14 
In response, Gruzalski cites experts who believe that 
the natural, instinctive urges and behavioral 
patterns...of... ancestral wild species have 
been little, if at all, bred out in the process of 
domestication.15 
In the face of this stalemate on the nature of domestic 
animals, we may reasonably err on the side of caution 
and place the burden of proof on those who would use 
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animals for food. In any event, the animal husbandry 
argument has been neutralized, since its goal was to 
show that meat farming is beneficial to animals, and 
we have seen that the replacement of farm animals by 
wild animals would create at least as much happiness 
as is currently experienced by farm animals. 16 
Moreover, even if we concede that domestic animals 
have no natural instincts that could be violated, our 
utilitarian approach still favors a world in which wild 
animals flourish in the place of domestic animals, since 
animals that both have a nature and live in nature 
arguably have richer, more fulfilling lives. 
Those who go beyond the utilitarian framework used 
in this paper can further criticize the confmement of 
animals on meat farms by citing Regan's view that 
raising animals on farms violates their inherent value, 
by treating them only as a means. Even though he 
rejects Singer's and Regan's approach, Callicott 
himself gives a nonutilitarian reason against factory 
farming, namely that it involves "the monstrous 
transformation of living things from an organic to a 
mechanical mode of being."17 
The foregoing discussion suggests that nonhuman 
animals would be better off ifwe completely ended meat 
farming than if we followed the tactic of Frey's 
concerned individual. Consequently, the justifiability 
of the concerned individual's lactic hinges on showing 
that the benefits for humans of continuing to raise 
animals for meat outweigh its disutility for nonhumans. 
Let us tum at last to Frey's main argument. 
Frey bases his utilitarian defense of meat farming 
on a detailed conjecture as to the bad economic 
consequences for humans of its cessation. is Frey 
predicts a massive loss of income and employment, 
not only for farmers but also for the vast number of 
people in meat-related industries. He also includes the 
loss of pleasure resulting from a decrease in such social 
activities as restaurant-going and barbecues. Since 
space does not permit detailed discussion of Frey's 
specific predictions, I will confine myself to a few 
general responses. 
First, Frey's argument is based on worst-case 
scenarios which underestimate the new economic and 
social opportunities that will arise because of the need 
for enormously greater production of vegetarian food. 
For instance, the growing popularity of vegetarianism 
in the United States and, especially, in England has led 
to a profusion of vegetarian restaurants, and most 
restaurants now offer vegetarian options. These 
92 Summer & Fall 1995 
A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism 
developments indicate that the gloomy predictions that 
Frey made twelve years ago about the future of the 
restaurant industry ifmeat eating were to be abandoned 
were unfounded. The fact that even MacDonalds bas 
developed a vegetarian burger, and that supermarkets 
now stock a wide variety ofdifferent types ofnon-meat 
burgers and hot dogs, undermines Frey's claim that fast 
food restaurants would collapse and shows that 
barbecues could continue even if we gave up meat. More 
generally, Frey's claim that all vegetarian restaurants 
are alike reflects the common myth that vegetarian 
cuisine is bland, a charge that is already belied by the 
imaginative menus available in such restaurants. 
Second, even granting that conversion to vegetar-
ianism would cause some economic bardship, and 
granting Frey's point that this hardship is commen· 
surable with animals' suffering,19 economic factors are 
unlikely to outweigb the physical and mental suffering 
that would remain for farm animals even ifwe reformed 
farming methods. By analogy, even a purely utilitarian 
approach, which forswears any reference to rights, 
would certainly not accept the economic arguments that 
could doubtless bave been made in favor ofchild labor 
in the 19th. century. The children's suffering outweighs 
any financial gains that might bave arisen from 
exploiting this source of cbeap or free labor. 
Tbird, a consistent utilitarian approacb must 
consider not only the potentially bannful effects for 
bumans of giving up raising animals for meat but also 
its potential benefits for us. As well as the health benefits 
arising from giving up meat, we must take into account 
the fact that, as a far more efficient source of protein 
than a meat-based diet, a vegetarian diet may belp 
substantially to alleviate the problem of world hunger.2o 
Now, Frey is aware of these arguments based on buman 
welfare,21 and, reasonably enough, be decides to focus 
instead on arguments based on animal welfare, since 
these arguments bave "recently given the question of 
vegetarianism a new focus."22 The problem for Frey is 
that tbe alleged harmful effects for bumans of 
vegetarianism playa vital role in bis response to the 
argument for vegetarianism basedon animals' suffering. 
The structure ofhis argument is that, since the concerned 
individual's tactic is effective in reducing animals' 
suffering, the harmful effects for humans of giving up 
meat farming are sufficient to tilt the utilitarian balance 
against vegetarianism. Consequently, any beneficial 
effects of vegetarianism for bumans are also directly 
relevant to Frey's utilitarian defense of meat farming, 
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yet be does not include these effects in bis discussion 
of consequences. Only if be can sbow that the benefits 
for humans of meat farming outweigb its disutility for 
animals arul/or humans has be successfully responded 
to Singer's utilitarian argument defended in this paper. 
In sum, Frey's argument, even if supplemented by 
the animal busbandry argument, fails to overcome the 
utilitarian case against raising animals for meat Neither 
bis contention that it will sufficiently reduce animals' 
suffering, nor bis argument that it will have betterresults 
for humans than vegetarianism, have succeeded in 
making the case for the concerned individual's strategy. 
Consequently, the only certainties are that today's meat 
farming causes the animals considerable suffering and 
that discontinuing meat farming will end that suffering. 
3. Human Supremacism 
We bave seen that meat eating is bard to justify on 
utilitarian grounds. Once we concede that the moral 
interests of nonhumans sbould be given equal weigbt 
alongside those of bumans in our moral deliberations, 
buman gains from meat eating appear trivial compared 
to animals' losses. At this point, many defenders ofmeat 
eating take a different tack and withdraw their assent 
from Singer's application of the equal consideration of 
interests principle to nonhumans. According to this 
position, wbich I call "buman supremacism," bumans' 
interests sbould count for more than those of non-
bumans, making utilitarian comparisons of human and 
nonhuman gains and losses inappropriate. 
The issue at stake between utilitarian vegetarians 
sucb as Singer and, on the other hand, buman 
supremacists is wbether the morality of meat eating 
depends on a quantitative comparison between the gains 
and losses of humans and animals. Singer believes that 
it does and argues that giving preference to bumans in 
spite of animals' greater interests is speciesist and, 
therefore, wrong. Human supremacists, in contrast, 
claim that a qualitative comparison is also needed. 
Because humans bave greater inherent moral value than 
nonbumans, human interests should take precedence 
over those of animals. I devote this section to an 
examination ofone such buman supremacist view, that 
of Carl Coben, who brazenly embraces the label of 
speciesist. His paper concerns medical experiments on 
animals, but I will consider its implications for 
vegetarianism.23 Cohen himselfclearly believes that bis 
argument justifies meat eating, since he offers as a 
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reductio ad absurdum of arguments against medical 
research on animals the consequence that meat eating 
24would also be wrong.
Speciesism is not analogous to racism and sexism, 
Cohen argues, because whereas no morally relevant 
distinctions exist between the races and sexes, the 
morally relevant differences between humans and 
nonhumans are "enormous, and almost universally 
appreciated.,,25 Now, Singer would not deny that 
humans, because of their greater intelligence, have 
greater interests than do nonbumans. The equal 
consideration of interests principle requires not equal 
treatment but, rather, that like interests be given equal 
weigbt. Consequently, in situations in which bumans' 
and nonhumans' interests clasb, bumans' greater 
interests will sometimesjustify giving them preference. 
For example, since "[n]orrnal adult buman beings bave 
mental capacities that will, in certain circumstances, 
lead them to suffer more than animals would in the same 
circumstances,"26 we may sometimes be more justified 
in performing scientific experiments on nonhumans 
tban on bumans. Singer opposes meat farming, 
bowever, because our benefits are easily outweigbed 
by animals' suffering. 
In contrast, Coben flatly denies that "the pains of 
all animate beings must be counted equally"27 and 
even that nonhumans bave any rigbts at all. On wbat 
qualities does Coben base bumans' alleged greater 
inberent moral value? 
Coben believes that only beings that are capable of 
both claiming their own and respecting other beings' 
rigbts are eligible for baving rigbts: 
Humans confront cboices that are purely 
moral; bumans-but certainly not dogs or 
mice-lay down moral laws, for others and 
for themselves. Human beings are self-
legislative, morally auto-nomous...Animals 
(that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense 
of that word) lack this capacity for free moral 
judgment. Tbey are not beings of a kind 
capable of exercising or responding to moral 
claims. Animals therefore bave no rigbts ...28 
Cohen does not deny that we do bave duties towards 
nonhumans, even thougb they have no rigbts. In 
particular, we "are at least obliged to act bumanely" 
towards animals, in view of their status as sentient 
creatures. But these obligations are imperfect, in the 
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sense that no animal bas a right to be treated in this 
way. Coben does not explain exactly what the extent of 
our imperfect obligations to animals is. At one point, 
be refers to the duty not to gratuitously barm sentient 
creatures. On the interpretation of "gratuitous" that I 
assume Cohen intends, this would rule out torturing 
animals for our pleasure but would permit virtually any 
of the currently cornmon uses ofnonhumans, including 
meat eating and medical experiments. However, 
defenders of animal rights regard most of these cornmon 
practices as gratuitous, because the sacrifices imposed 
on nonhumans are not outweighed by human gains. 
Consequently, Cohen's view, whatever its other merits, 
fails to give a clear criterion for determining which uses 
of nonhumans are justified. 
To his credit, Cohen deals directly with the most 
obvious objection to his account of rights. The objection, 
the so-called "argument from marginal cases," is that 
very young, severely retarded, or comatose bumans 
would also fail to qualify if being able to exercise and 
respond to moral claims is a necessary condition for 
baving rights.29 They are not moral agents, since they 
are unable to reciprocate any moral concern that we 
show towards them, nor are they able even to understand 
any moral claims that may be made on their own behalf. 
But we do regard them as having rights, and we punish 
people, sucb as child abusers, wbo violate these rights.30 
Coben's response is that qualification for rights 
depends upon the "natural moral functions" of the 
species. Members that, due to youth, birth defects or 
accidents, do not bave these capacities are, as it were, 
carried through on the coattails of the rest of the species. 
The capacity for moral judgment that distin-
guisbes bumans from animals is not a test to 
be administered to buman beings one by 
one...The issue is one of kind.31 
All nonhuman animals, in contrast, simply lack the 
capacities that most bumans have. The first problem 
with Coben's respon~ is that, while it produces the 
result be desires-bumans bave rigbts, and nonhurnans 
don't-it amounts to an assertion rather than an 
argument. Exactly why sbould rigbts be based on the 
normal capacities of a species rather than on the 
capacities of eacb individual member? Second, his view 
seems to entail an absurd consequence. Suppose that 
one of the cbimpanzees that bave been taught sign 
language develops an ability to understand moral 
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arguments, to restrain its behavior in the light of these 
arguments, and to make moral claims on its own behalf. 
These abilities would remain far above the "natural 
moral functions" of chimpanzees as a species. 
Consequently, according to the view that bases rights 
upon the normal capacities of the species as a whole, 
this chimpanzee would have to be denied the status of 
a right-holder. But this seems arbitrary and unfair. 
None of this is to deny that humans' greater 
capacities sometimes give rise to special moral 
obligations towards them. For instance, because of their 
ability to make and respond to moral claims, I am able 
to make agreements and promises and to enjoy deep, 
mutually supportive relationships with healthy humans 
that are difficult or impossible with nonhumans or 
"marginal" humans. These agreements, promises and 
relationships make our moral ties to healthy adult 
humans more extensive and complex than those we have 
to nonhumans. But this does not preclude nonbumans 
from having rights, any more than the fact that I have 
special moral obligations towards some people, such 
as my friends and family members, precludes strangers 
from having moral rights that I treat them certain ways. 
Since I am defending Singer's utilitarian view, my 
response to Cohen is not intended to show that animals 
have rights. My point, rather, is that nonhumans have 
as much claim to baving rights as do humans and that 
the existence of special obligations towards healthy 
adult humans does not entail human supremacism. 
Similarly, I can concede other justified differences 
between the moral standing ofhealthy adult humans and 
nonbumans, without resorting to human supremacism. 
The view that only self-conscious beings capable of 
future-oriented desires, especially the desire for continued 
life, can have a tight ro life32 can be justified on the 
utilitarian ground that persons' greatermental capacities, 
including their greater power of anticipation, mean that 
they would losemore than nonpersons from being killed. 
These human capacities that are not shared by 
nonhumans--e.g., the ability to make and respect moral 
claims and to form extensive future-oriented desires-
will sometimes act as a "tie-breaker" that justifies giving 
preference to humans-for instance, ifwe bad to choose 
between feeding humans or a dog in a time of extreme 
shortage. However, the justification for giving 
preference to humans has nothing to do with humans' 
alleged greater inherent moral worth. It is, rather, that 
giving equal weight to the like interests ofhumans and 
nonhumans, an impartial utilitarian calculus requires 
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that we give preference to humans in these rare 
situations. The moral community is strengthened when, 
other things being equal, we give priority to beings 
capable of reciprocating our moral concern. And when 
either a human or a nonhuman has to suffer physically 
or die, humans' greater capacity for suffering will 
usually tilt the utilitarian balance in their favor. 
The situation is completely different when we 
consider the utilities involved in the debate over meat 
eating. Since we do not need meat to survive, we are 
not faced with the choice of imposing comparable 
suffering on either humans or nonhumans, and so 
humans' greater capacities are irrelevant to the tradeoff 
ofinterests involved. As we saw in the previous section, 
a quantitative comparison of rival interests shows that 
human gains are insufficient to justify the imposition 
of suffering on noubumans. So, the only way to justify 
continuing to raise animals for food is to abandon the 
utilitarian approach that gives equal weight to the like 
interests of humans and nonhumans. But we have just 
seen that Cohen has failed to give a cogent reason for 
abandoning the utilitarian approach and regarding 
human interests as qualitatively more important than 
those of nonhumans. Consequently, the human 
supremacist approach fails to dislodge our earlier 
conclusion that raising animals for food is wrong. 
4. Conclusion: Tbeory and Practice 
I have argued that the strongest utilitarian defense of 
raising animals for meat-Frey's-does not work and 
that the human supremacist attempt to sidestep 
utilitarian calculations by attributing greater intrinsic 
moral worth to humans is unfounded. However, even 
if we accept that the discontinuation of raising animals 
for meat would have better results than following the 
concerned individual's tactic, Frey points out that a 
crucial step remains to be provided before any utilitarian 
argument can condemn meat eating. This step is 
showing that the act of becoming a vegetarian and 
encouraging others to do so will actually help to achieve 
the goal of the abolition of meat farming and, hence, 
produce better results than the concerned individual's 
tactic. Frey argues that the practical impact of anyone 
person's becoming a vegetarian will be negligible, given 
the vastness of the meat industry in countries like the 
u.s,33 In contrast, political action in order to reform 
farming practices to reduce animals' suffering is far 
more likely to produce tangible benefits. 
95 Between the Species 
A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism 
In response, the private action of becoming a 
vegetarian in no way precludes political activism of 
precisely the kind that Frey supports. The only 
difference is that the activism would aim at the abolition, 
rather than the reform, of raising animals for meat. 
Additionally, while my becoming a vegetarian may have 
negligible effect, Frey dismisses too easily the impact 
of the combined effect of thousands of people's 
becoming vegetarians. Given the dramatic increase in 
vegetarian restaurants and vegetarian options within 
conventional restaurants in the twelve years since Frey's 
book appeared, we may plausibly claim that conversion 
to vegetarianism really has reduced the amount ofmeat 
that would otherwise have been produced and 
consumed. Finally, as vegetarianism becomes more 
"mainstream," it gains more credibility and power as 
a political force. 
My second response to Frey concerns the morality 
of eating today's meat, the vast majority of which is 
raised on the very factory farms that he wants to reform. 
A great strength ofFrey's book is that he gives a detailed 
and sophisticated discussion ofthe charges ofinsincerity 
and inconsistency that we might level at the concerned 
individual, who, while campaigning for reform, 
continues to eat meat raised in a manner that he or she 
concedes causes unfair suffering to animals.34 Frey 
responds plausibly enough by pointing out that 
demanding that we have absolutely no contact with a 
practice that we consider wrong is unduly rigid. For 
instance, I can quite actively and consistently oppose 
my country's foreign policies, without leaving the 
country in order to express the extent ofmy disapproval. 
Similarly, argues Frey, as long as the concerned 
individual actively strives to reform cruel farming 
practices, the fact that she continues to eat meat is proof 
of neither insincerity nor inconsistency. 
However, continuing to eat meat while striving for 
reform is different in a crucial respect from Frey's 
analogies. Remaining in a country and trying to change 
its policies from within is arguably far more effective 
than simply leaving the country and having no contact 
with it. In contrast, continuing to eat meat seems to have 
no positive impact on the effectiveness of the concerned 
individual's attempt to end cruel farming practices. On 
the contrary, a reduction in the demand for meat (which 
is the likely result of a temporary boycott by concerned 
individuals) would seem to create economic pressure 
on the meat industry that is likely to accelerate the 
desired reforms. Once the reforms have occurred, the 
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concerned individual may then resume eating meat. So 
even the concerned individual is not justified in eating 
meat raised on today's factory farms. The concerned 
individual who continues to eat meat, even though she 
admits that it was produced in cruel conditions and that 
her eating meat will in no way enhance her efforts to 
improve these cruel conditions, seems to be guilty of a 
lack ofintegrity. 
In conclusion, my utilitarian argument that raising 
animals for meat is wrong does indeed demand a 
vegetarian diet. And even ifFrey were correct that trying 
to reform our practice ofraising animals for meat would 
have better consequences than working for its abolition, 
eating the meat raised on today's factory farms would 
still not be justified on utilitarian grounds. 
I am grateful to an anonymous referee, commen-
tatorAlex Wellington, Harlan Miller, and audience 
members for helpful suggestions. 
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